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Monica Keneley
Does Organizational Heritage Matter in
the Development of Offshore Markets?
The Case of Australian Life Insurers
The globalization of financial markets over the past decade
has focused the spotlight on the responsiveness of financial
firms to international pressures. Insurance markets have tra-
ditionally relied on global networks not only to expand the in-
surers' sphere of influence but also to support domestic busi-
ness. Until relatively recently, Australian insurance companies
have not played a significant role in the development of inter-
national markets. However, in the last decade of the twentieth
century Australian insurers ventured overseas on a scale with-
out precedence. This article presents an historical perspective
on the internationalization of the Australian life-insurance
market with a view to understanding why these firms have
been classified "late starters" in the internationalization stakes.
In a broader capacity it provides insights into the impediments
to overseas expansion and the forces encouraging or discour-
aging the development of cross border networks.
Insurance was one of the very first markets to develop on a globalbasis. A number of studies have demonstrated the link between in-
surance products and the growth strategies of insurance providers.^
Mira Wilkins traces the development of international insurance mar-
kets, pointing to how strategic insurance firms were in developing cross-
border relationships and the value of these international markets to their
bottom line.^ The British were among the first to build the insurance
' Recent publications highlight the extent of research undertaken in this respect: Peter
Borscheid and Robin Pearson, eds.. Internationalization and Globalization of the Insurance
Industry in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Zurich, 2007); Robin Pearson, ed.. The
Development of International Insurance (London, 2010); and Peter Borscheid and Niels
Viggo Haueter, eds.. World Insurance: The Evolution of a Global Risk Network (Oxford,
2012).
^Mira Wilkins, "Multinational Enterprise in Insurance: An Historical Overview," Busi-
ness History 51, no. 3 (2009): 334-63.
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business as a multinational enterprise.^ Barry Supple estimates that
British companies were earning around 60 percent of total fire premi-
ums in non-European markets by 1900.'' American and European in-
surers likewise have had a history of large international networks in the
past. Robin Pearson and Mikael Lönnborg in their study of multi-
national property insurers remark on the range of countries exporting
insurance in the nineteenth century.^ Insurers in countries such as the
United Kingdom, Germany, France, the United States, Canada, China,
and Japan, to name a few, extended their operations beyond domestic
borders in the 1870s and 1880s. Although discontinuities occurred over
time, they left a heritage in the countries where they located that has in-
fiuenced the development of these local markets. Multinational insur-
ance enterprises in this context have played an important role in devel-
oping national and international financial markets.
A review of the pattern of internationalization of insurance markets
reveals certain trends that highlight the fluid nature of expansion paths.
Pearson and Lönnborg identify three phases of offshore expansion by
insurance companies, pointing out that the industry became truly global
in the third phase after 1850.^ The push to acquire overseas markets in-
creased ftom the mid-nineteenth century, driven initially by British fire
offices and followed by a second wave of expansion by European and
American companies.^ These companies were generally large compos-
ite stock companies selling fire and later other forms of property insur-
ance. With the exception of three American offices, the export of life-
insurance products did not meet with the same degree of success as
non-life products.^
In addition to European and North American markets, fire-insurance
exports extended to Australasia, South America, Southern Aftica, and
the Asia/Pacific. Studies of specific markets highlight this expansionary
phase but also point to the difficulties in maintaining links across great
distances. Jeronia Pons Pons, in her study of the Spanish market, draws
attention to the role of the changing regulatory environment that influ-
enced exit decisions both in the exporting and host nation. She con-
cludes that specialized companies that based expansion strategies on
3 Robin Pearson, Insuring the Industi'ial Revolution: Fire Insurance in Great Britain,
1700-1850 (Aldershot, 2004).
•I Barry Supple, "Corporate Growth and Structural Change in a Service Industry: Insur-
ance, 1870-1914," in Essays in British Business History, ed. Barry Supple (Oxford, 1977), 71.
5 Robin Pearson and Mikael Lönnborg, "Regulatory Regimes and Multinational Insurers
before 1914," Business History Review 82 (Spring 2008): 67.
* Ibid., 61.
'Pearson, ed.. The Development of International Insurance, 11-12.
*These companies were the Equitable, New York Life, and Mutual Life; Pearson, ed.. The
Development of International Insurance, 15.
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scale factors left the Spanish market. General insurance companies that
opted to diversify their operations remained.^ In the South African life-
insurance market, the introduction of regulatory devices specifically
restricting investment by life insurers provided the catalyst for foreign
exits.'° Peter Borscheid points to a "globalization backlash" that wit-
nessed a retreat from international markets in the interwar years. A
major influence on the contraction of the international insurance trade
was the rise of economic nationalism and accompanying protectionist
policies that altered the regulatory environments in which exporting
companies operated."
The patterns of expansion and retreat that are evident in the histo-
ries of many insurance markets indicate the complexities associated
with establishing and maintaining international links. Understanding
these links has become more important as the second wave of globaliza-
tion, in the wake of market liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, has
once again seen the growth in cross-border trade in insurance markets.
Despite ample research into the internationalization strategies of com-
panies from leading insurance export nations, less is known about the
factors influencing insurers in other nations either to participate or not
in cross-border trade. In many of these countries insurers are now ac-
tively engaging in cross-border activities. Australian life insurers are a
case in point. While historically these institutions have limited oftshore
activities, in the last two decades they have ventured abroad on a scale
not seen previously. This article examines the impediments to adopting
such strategies and explores what the strategies can tell us about the
forces encouraging or discouraging the overseas expansion of insurance
companies. It specifically questions why Australian insurers retained a
local focus for so long, what factors led them to change this focus, and
how their previous history helped or hindered overseas expansion.
Australian firms have been classified "late starters" in the inter-
nationalization stakes.^ ^ Australia, while it has long received inward
foreign direct investment (FDI), has lagged behind in terms of outward
FDI. Analysis suggests that the combination of weak country-specific
'Jeronia Pons Pons, "Multinational Enterprises and Institutional Regulation in the Life
Insurance Market in Spain, 1880-1934," Business History Review 82 (Spring 2008): 113.
'"Grietjie Verhoef, "Life Offices to the Rescue! A History of the Role of Life Insurance in
the South African Economy during the Twentieth Century," in The Development of Inter-
national Insurance, ed. Robin Pearson (London, 2010), 145-66.
" Peter Borscheid, "A Globalization Backlash in the Intenvar Years," in Internationaliza-
tion and Globalization of the Insurance Industry in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centu-
ries, ed. Peter Borscheid and Robin Pearson (Zurich, 2007).
'^  David Merrett, "Australian Multinationals in Historical Perspective," in The Inter-
nationalization Strategies of Small-Country Firms: The Australian Experience of Global-
ization, ed. Howard Dick and David T. Merrett (Cheltenham, UK, 2007).
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and firm-specific assets worked against outward FDI.^ ^ A. similar argu-
ment is that domestic factors constrained internationalization, and in
turn inward technology flows and the dominance of foreign multi-
national enterprises influenced domestic factors.^ "* Sectoral analysis of
the approach of different firms to internationalization points to a com-
plex array of inducements and impediments to successful foreign ex-
pansion. This article investigates the factors that have influenced the
ability of life insurers to compete in global markets and the bearing of
their past heritage on this process. In doing so, it analyzes the inter-
nationalization path of Australian insurance markets. Previous studies
have focused on the evolution of organizational structures in the do-
mestic market.^5 j ^ g current article builds on that work but specifi-
cally addresses the issues influencing the internationalization strategies
wathin Australia's largest life insurers with a view to providing further
insights into the development of multinational insurance enterprises.
In the next section the article will review explanations of factors
that influence the outcomes of globalization strategies. It wall then con-
sider the experience of the Australian insurance industry and link it to
the preceding discussion. Finally, it will address the question of whether
or not the past assisted or impeded the industry in implementing a
modern global strategy.
Perspectives on Internationalization Strategies
A review of the literature on internationalization suggests a range of
explanations for why firms may venture offshore. The lack of consensus
highlights the complexities in understanding the motivations and actions
of firms operating across borders. Broadly speaking, internationaliza-
tion theories fall into several general categories. The transaction-cost
and resource-based approaches focus on rational decision-making pro-
cesses. The eclectic paradigm, as hypothesized by John Dunning, for
example, argues that firms will undertake FDI if they possess owTier-
ship advantages that enable them to overcome the barriers to doing
'3 David Merrett, "Australian Firms Abroad before 1970: Why So Few, WTiy Those, and
WTiy There?" Business History 44, no. 2 (2002): 65-87.
""Elizabeth Maitland and Stephen Nicholas, "The Internationalization of Australian
Firms in Asia," International Studies of Management and Organization 32, no. 1 (2002):
79-108.
'5 Monica Keneley, "Organizational Capabilities and the Role of Routines in the Emer-
gence of a Modern Life Insurer: The Story of the AMP," Business History 51, no. 2 (2009):
248-67 and Monica Keneley, "Adaptation and Change in the Australian Life Insurance In-
dustry: An Historical Perspective," Accounting Business and Financial History 14, no. 1
(2004): 91-109.
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business outside their domestic sphere.'^ On the other hand, a resource-
based interpretation suggests that the possession of a unique set of
capabilities or resources allows firms to gain an advantage in inter-
national markets. David Collis draws out the link between the firm's
past, arguing that its historical evolution constrains its strategic choice
and outcomes.^'' He nominates three essential elements—core compe-
tence, organizational capabilities, and administrative heritage—as hav-
ing a bearing on the outcomes of globalization strategies. Collis further
asserts that the economic-based and resource-based approaches can be
seen as complementing each other. While the economic approach fo-
cuses on outcomes in the product market, the resource-based approach
adds depth to this explanation through an analysis of the way in which
resources are accumulated and used.^ ^
Alternative explanations concentrate on the processes of interna-
tionalization, focusing on the role of organizational learning. The Swed-
ish models, such as explained by Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne,
suggest that the gradual acquisition and integration of knowledge about
overseas markets allow firms to extend progressively into new mar-
kets.^ ^ Another explanation of the firm's ability to extend into inter-
national markets is that put forward by Christopher Bartlett and Su-
mantra Ghoshal, who have emphasized the concept of administrative
heritage. According to this model, a company's administrative heritage
shapes its internal capabilities, which in turn constrain its ability to re-
spond to the international environment.^° Diftering development paths
result in differing approaches to internationalization. Bartlett and
Ghoshal point to the links between the internationalization strategy,
the environment in which the firm operates, its structure, and manage-
ment as determined by its administrative heritage. The most successful
firms were those that were able to match the correct internationaliza-
tion strategy to the environmental conditions of the market. However,
the ability to do this was constrained by their organizational structure,
which was a function of their cultural and physical heritage.^^
•'John Dunning, "The Eclectic Paradigm of International Business: Past, Present, and
Future," International Journal of the Economics of Business 8, no. 2 (2001): 173-90.
'^  David Collis, "A Resource-Based Analysis of Global Competition: The Case of the Bear-
ings Industry," Strategic Management Journal 12 (Summer 1991): 51.
'8 Ibid., 65.
' ' Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne, "The Internationalization Process of the Firm: A
Model of Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Market Commitments," Journal
of International Business Studies 8, no. 1 (1977): 23-32 and Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik
Vahlne, "The Mechanism of Internationalization," International Marketing Review 7, no. 4
(1990): 11-24.
^"Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal, Managing across Borders: The Trans-
national Solution, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1998), 39-40.
^'Collis, "Resource Based Analysis," 52.
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Since the 1990s the theoretical debate has broadened as the pro-
cess of internationalization has entered a new phase. Peter Buckley and
Mark Casson argue that previous explanations fail to take account of
the growing volatility in the international business environment. They
make the case for a more dynamic model. At the core of this approach is
a focus on flexibility in explaining responses to the restructuring of
international business and the emergence of new forms of enterprise.
Changing research agendas have extended the models of international-
ization, with the incorporation of new foci that include uncertainty and
market volatility, new modes of business practice such as joint ventures,
and the role of entrepreneurs.^^
Theories of internationalization have tended to concentrate on
the behavior of manufacturing firms. The applicability of such models to
service firms has been questioned. ^ ^ However, recent studies have
found that these models can provide a solid foundation for under-
standing the strategic decisions of service industries. Rakshekar Ja-
valgi, David Griffith, and Steven White, for example, have found that
firm and location-specific factors are important in the internationaliza-
tion of service firms. However, service firms are different from manu-
facturing firms in that they require less capital investment to expand
overseas. This factor impacts on decision making within the firm, sug-
gesting that the managerial attitudes have a strong impact on offshore
expansion plans.^'' Rodney Benjamin and David Merrett argue that
Australian insurers were inward looking and highly conservative, which
hampered their ability to internationalize.^^ This tradition impacted
managerial attitudes and only began to change in the 1980s. Much of
this conservatism derived from the past development of the organiza-
tion and the market in which it operated. It suggests that the historical
context is important in understanding the international expansion path
adopted by Australian insurers. In this respect, it is argued that three
factors influenced the approach and outcome of the strategy. These
were: the historical structure of the market, organizational history, and
cultures and managerial capabilities.
^^  Peter Buckley and Mark Casson, "Models of International Enterprise," Journal of In-
ternational Business Studies 29, no. 1 (1998): 21-44.
3^ Johanson and Vahlne, "The Mechanism of Internationalization," 15.
^Rakshekar Javalgi, David Griffith, and Steven White, "An Empirical Examination of
Factors Infiuencing the Internationalization of Service Firms," Journal of Services Market-
ing 17, no. 2 (2003): 185-201.
5^ Rodney Benjamin and David Merrett, "Financial Services: Banking and Insurance," in
The Internationalization Strategies of Small-Country Firms: The Australian Experience of
Globalization, ed. Howard Dick and David T. Merrett (Cheltenham, UK, 2007).
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Australian Life-insurance Markets
and Their International Links
The history of Australian insurance markets has been relatively
unique in that, for many years, there was a separation between provid-
ers of life and general insurance. This division originated through mar-
ket failure in respect to the supply of life insurance, leading to the es-
tablishment of mutual insurers who became the market leaders. A key
aspect of this market failure was to do with the risks connected with the
provision of life insurance. Henry Hansmann has argued that the mu-
tual forms emerged in response to the failure of the market to provide
the type of service consumers wanted. ^ ^ In this context, there were two
significant issues: problems associated vdth contracting under condi-
tions of uncertainty and those associated with ownership. A lack of ac-
curate data on mortality rates and the inability to predict unforeseen
contingencies over a substantial period of time increased the possibility
of losses associated with life-insurance policies. While mutual insurers
faced these same problems, they were able to overcome them more ef-
fectively. The absence of shareholder interests reduced the risk of op-
portunistic behavior on the part of the firm, allowing it to set premium
rates high enough to cover worst-case scenarios. In the event that the
risk was overestimated, the accumulation of reserves would be returned
to policyholders in the form of bonus payments.^'' The mutual form be-
came a common structure in markets such as life insurance, where
problems associated with asymmetric information and moral hazard
were paramount. Australia in the colonial period was very much a fron-
tier economy where such risks were higher than in the more stable Brit-
ish and European markets.
The nature of the regulatory environment reinforced the division
between life and non-life providers so that the development paths of
these two sectors of the insurance market have been very difterent.
Likewise, the interaction with global markets and development of inter-
nationalization strategies has also been very different. This article fo-
cuses on the life-insurance market. Specifically, it explores the paths to
international diversification taken by major insurers who counted their
core business as the sale of life insurance.
Within the life-insurance sector, three phases in the development
of international links can be identified. The first, from the birth of the
industry to the 1950s, is marked by a limited international interaction
both in respect to the presence of overseas firms in domestic markets
*^ Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), 266-68.
^^  Henry Hansmann, "The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1, no. 1 (1985): 134.
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and vice versa. The second, from the late 1950s to the 1980s, witnessed
an increase in the international dialogue with the entrance of a number
of overseas firms into the Australian market. The third, dating from the
mid-1980s, was associated with the rapid offshore expansion of major
Australian life insurers.
Phase One: Limited International Interaction. The earliest life
insurers to operate in the Australian market were branches of British
companies.^^ However, these firms did not flourish and exited the mar-
ket soon after establishment. A key factor in their demise appears to
have been the failure of their agency-based marketing system that re-
lied on customers applying for a policy rather than the agent actively
selling policies.^^ More generally, the underdeveloped nature of colo-
nial economies at this time meant that the market for such products,
apart from being very risky, was quite limited in size.
The impetus of the gold rushes of the 1850s in promoting popula-
tion growth and industrial development provided the catalyst for the
expansion of the life-insurance market. Between the 1860s and 1890s,
the Australian colonies experienced a sustained economic boom. Real
gross national product (GNP) grew at an average of 4.8 percent and
per capita real GNP by 1.3 percent between 1861 and 1889.^° Economic
growfth was also associated with the urbanization of the colonies and
the growth of major population centers, providing a ready market for
insurance products. It was during this time that the local insurance
market developed. Of significant importance to the future development
of the industry was the emergence of mutual life insurers. Where pri-
vate providers had been unable to fulfill the needs of the market, mutu-
als thrived and rapidly grew to become the market leaders.
In the 1860s there were around eighteen British companies with ei-
ther agencies or offices in Australia, but their presence in the life mar-
ket was limited. By 1890 most had exited leaving only three remaining,
and they were not writing new business.^^ The progressive exit of Brit-
ish companies from the Australian market was reinforced by the in-
creasing success of local mutual societies. The Australian Mutual Provi-
dent Society (AMP) was the first mutual to establish in Sydney, New
South Wales, in 1849. In the late 1860s the Mutual Life Association of
Australasia and the National Mutual Life Association were formed, fol-
lowed in the next decade by the Colonial Mutual Life, the Temperance
and General, and several smaller and more specialized mutual societies.
*^ Arthur C. Gray, Life Insurance in Australia (Melbourne, 1977), 12-17.
='Ibid., 23.
3° Rodney Maddock and Ian McLean, eds.. The Australian Economy in the Long Run
(Cambridge, UK, 1987), 14.
''Gray, Life Insurance in Australia, 22—23.
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The number of local stock life insurers was limited, with only four of any
consequence in operation.''^ Their focus was primarily on short-term
insurance, and they did not actively engage in selling life insurance to
the extent that the mutuals did.^ ^
By 1880 the seven mutual insurers accounted for more than 80 per-
cent of new policies sold.^ "* This established the pattern of industry
dominance by mutuals for the next century. Amalgamations and merg-
ers between large and small mutuals reduced the number to five major
mutuals by the turn of the twentieth century. These firms accounted for
more than 80 percent of industry assets, a ratio that was maintained
until the late 1970s. Limited inward foreign direct investment occurred
from two sources: the New Zealand Government Insurance Office
(NZGIO) established in 1869 and a small number of American insurers
who entered the market in the 1880s. The New Zealand Government
Office did a small amount of business in the Australian colonies. Its sig-
nificance lay in providing an incentive for Australian companies to ex-
pand their own operations in New Zealand. Three large American life
insurers—New York Life, Equitable Life, and Mutual Life of New York
—commenced selling policies in the Australian colonies in the 1880s.
While these insurers were initially quite successful, they were unable to
make sustained inroads into the market share of the large mutuals. By
the turn of the century, the costs of supporting the Australasian busi-
ness were impacting profitability. Trouble on the home front, in the
form of the Armstrong Inquiry, commissioned to investigate the con-
duct of life insurers in the state of New York, triggered the Americans'
exit from the Australian market.
Two factors impacted on the success of American insurers in build-
ing their businesses in the Australian colonies. The first was that the in-
surance products they sold were more restrictive than those marketed
by Australian firms. Australian life policies were among the most liberal
in English-speaking countries. Australian offices were the first to intro-
duce non-forfeiture provisions: for example, they had relaxed condi-
tions relating to travel and also provided loans to policyholders based
on the value of their policies.^^ jhe American offices brought with
them tontine products which they had successfully marketed in other
3^  Few records of life-insurance companies have survived. Gray's review of post office di-
rectories lists several others, which were of a transitory nature, not surviving for more than a
year or two at the most. Ibid.
33 Gray, Life Insurance in Australia, 24-28.
3''Calculated from the returns of Australasian life insurers as listed in the Australasian
Insurance and Banking Record (Melbourne, 1881).
35 Previously a policy holder who defaulted on a premium payment forfeited the total
value of his policy. Under the non-forfeiture provision a policy could not lapse as long as
there were sufficient funds from the surrender value to pay the premium.
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countries.3^ In Spain, for instance, the sale of tontine products allowed
American companies to become leaders in the life-insurance market.^^
These products met with a moderate degree of success in Australia.
Their reputation suffered under a concerted public attack ftom the
managers of the AMP, the largest life insurer. A vitriolic twenty-year
war of words in the press between the AMP and its American competi-
tors dampened consumer enthusiasm for tontine insurance. Some local
companies set up their own types of tontines, but the system did not
meet with the success that it had in other markets.^^
The second factor influencing the success of American insurers in
Australia was the extent of competition ftom local firms. Morton Keller
makes the point that nowhere else were local offices more progressive
and nowhere did the large American offices meet with such stiff compe-
tition as in Australia.39 British offices, such as the Standard Life, re-
ported similar experiences. The Standard Life decided against opening
a branch in Australia in the 1890s because of local opposition ftom mu-
tual companies.''"
The range of products offered by life insurers expanded as life of-
fices grew and actuarial practice became more advanced. Endowment
policies, as opposed to whole or life policies, became increasingly popu-
lar in the late nineteenth century, introducing a savings element into
the life-insurance policy. ''^  This was a trend evident in Britain and emu-
lated in Australia, where it grew rapidly.''^ Actuarial developments and
the construction of more accurate mortality tables allowed further scope
for refinement of life policies. By the 1880s it was possible to take out
life policies with profits or without profits, term policies and policies al-
lowing for a form of income protection. Industrial insurance was first
sold in Australia in 1884 and also grew over the next two decades.''^ The
ä^Tontine policies represented a pooling of funds among a group of life insurance policy
holders for a specific period of time from between ten to twenty years. The policy benefits of
those who died during this period were redistributed to surviving policy holders.
^'Jeronia Pons Pons, "Large American Corporations in the Spanish Life Insurance Mar-
ket (1880-1922)," Journal of European Economic History 34, no. 2 (2005): 470.
'^Geoffrey Blainey, A History of the AMP (Sydney, 1999), 98-100; AMP Guard Books
(1885-1907), AMP Archives, Sydney.
3'Morton Keller, Life Insurance Enterprise, 1885-1910 (Cambridge Mass., 1963), 81-82.
'"'Michael Moss, The Building of Europe's Largest Mutual Life Company: Standard Life,
1825-2000 (Edinburgh, 2000), 102 and 134.
"" Whole life policies were insurance contracts which paid an agreed sum on the death of
the policy holder. An endowment insurance contract paid a lump sum either on death or the
maturity of a contract which specified that contributions be made for a certain number of
years.
••^  Barry Supple, The Royal Exchange: A History of British Insurance, 1720-1970 (Cam-
bridge, UK, 1970), 221; Gray, Life Insurance, 60-61.
"•3 Industrial insurance was first introduced in Britain in the 1850s. Industrial insurance
policies were small-value policies paid by weekly or monthly premiums and targeted at lower
income groups.
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per capita sale of insurance policies in the Australasian colonies in the
1880s outpaced that in Britain. In Australasia, premium income in-
creased at an average rate of 8 percent between 1884 and 1889, com-
pared to an average rate of 2.5 percent in Britain.''^ The expansion in
premium income was associated with the growing sophistication of
life-insurance organizations that were evolving as financial intermedi-
aries. Branch networks expanded but the focus remained on the domes-
tic market.
Foreign direct investment by Australian life insurers was limited at
this point. One reason for this was that the domestic market was grow-
ing at a sufficient pace to provide more than adequate returns for local
firms. The degree of competitive pressure felt in other countries, such
as Britain and the US, was not evident in the Australian market and did
not provide the impetus to search for other opportunities. Two of the
major mutuals ventured overseas in their first few years of business and
proudly proclaimed their international network. In reality though (with
the exception of New Zealand), this was a strategy designed to provide
services to Australians abroad rather than expand market potential.
The path of expansion followed the passenger-shipping route between
Australia and London, later detouring to closer Asia/Pacific markets.
The Colonial Mutual opened branches in South Africa and an agency in
Fiji in the 1870s and 1880s. The National Mutual followed a similar pat-
tern, with branches in South Africa and London and agencies in Ceylon
and Fiji. The largest life insurer, the AMP, lagged behind its rivals in ex-
panding overseas. The management of the AMP originally planned to
open a London branch in 1886; however, policyholder resistance delayed
the opening until 1908. At the heart of the opposition was the question
of whether or not such expansion was in the best interests of these
policyholders. Legal opinion suggested that overseas expansion was
against the spirit of the original statute of incorporation. A key issue in
the debate was the level of risk associated with the operation of the of-
fice in another country. It was thought that mortality rates were higher
in Britain than in Australia and that this would increase the liabilities of
the Society.''^  The sentiment expressed was that the AMP should remain
focused on its Australian constituency and not look further afield.''^
The exception to the rule in the development of cross-border mar-
kets was New Zealand. Branches of all major life insurers were opened
in this country in the 1870s and 1880s with the general acceptance of
policyholders. One explanation for this is that in the days before the
proclamation of nationhood, Australians and Australian businesses saw
'*'' Gray, Life Insurance, 49.
••5 Blainey, History of the AMP, 149-50.
'^^Australasian Insurance and Banking Record, 13 May 1886.
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themselves as part of the Australasian colonies.'*^ The commercial links
between the two countries were a lot closer than they became later in
the twentieth century and the interaction between managers of colonial
insurance companies a lot more ftequent.''^ There was a perception that
New Zealand was a local market and that the links between branches
there and the head office were as easily maintained as in other Austra-
lian colonies.''^ A further factor in stimulating the establishment of
branches in New Zealand was the participation of government in the
life-insurance market. The New Zealand Government Life Insurance
Office operated in direct competition with mutual insurers in both that
country and Australia. Concern over the potential of this organization
to gain market share was undoubtedly a consideration in the decision
to extend branches in New Zealand.^" By 1885 the NZGIO was the sec-
ond largest Australasian insurer in terms of assets, nearly double the
size of the National Mutual Life Association, Australia's second largest
The level of outward FDI continued to represent only a small pro-
portion of industry income until the mid-twentieth century. In con-
trast to American and British companies, who generated an increasing
amount of their income ftom overseas direct investment, there was not
the imperative for Australian insurers to venture far ftom home.^ ^ The
growth of population and expansion of the domestic economy ensured
that the domestic demand for life insurance was growing at a sufficient
rate to support the local industry. Unlike British and US markets, where
competitive pressures domestically forced insurers to look offshore,
the Australian market had sufficient levels of demand to satisfy local
supply.
Phase Two: The Expansion of Inward FDI. Until the 1950s
there had been a clear separation between life and general insurance
providers. For the most part, life-insurance firms did not sell non-life
insurance and vice versa. This division was broken in 1957 when the
British firm, the Legal and General, a large composite company, applied
•"For example, the leading banking and insurance journal was the Australasian In-
surance and Banking Record, which reported in depth on financial conditions in both
countries.
••^ An example of the link in insurance circles can be seen in the formation of the New Zea-
land tariff system in the 1890s. The meetings of New Zealand insurers responsible for form-
ing the tariff association took place in Melbourne rather than a New Zealand city. At this
point Melbourne was the recognized center of the Australasian insurance market.
""See note 48 above.
^"Australasian Insurance and Banking Record, 14 July 1885.
5'Ibid., Jan. 1885.
^^For example, the New York Life did almost one-third of its business overseas in 1885.
Wilkins, "Multinational Enterprise in Insurance," 338.
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for a license to sell life insurance in Australia.^^ xhe move sparked a
flood of further license applications, principally from other general in-
surers. British composite insurers had long had a presence in the gen-
eral insurance market, but it wasn't until the 1950s that they made a
concerted push into the life-insurance market. Within five years, the
number of overseas representatives had risen from eight to twenty-
five.^'* By 1962 the life market consisted of a number of British insurers
as well as representation from the Netherlands, Switzerland, and New
Zealand. Most of the new entrants, however, were British firms.
By 1973 the number of foreign-controlled firms had risen to thirty-
six, compared to fourteen Australian-owned entities. However, these
foreign entities represented a much smaller proportion of the market.
Their share of premium income was a bit over 19 percent and share of
total assets about 13 percent.^s The market share of foreign-ovraed com-
panies remained small, but the Australian market was increasingly seen
as a potential destination of interest for foreign insurers.^^ Aside from
establishing a subsidiary company, the most popular method of foreign
direct investment was to acquire a registered Australian company.
Mergers and acquisitions of smaller local life insurers increased with
the growrth in foreign participation. The issue of foreign takeover, how-
ever, was a matter of concern for the government of the day. In 1968
foreign interests viewed wàth concern the actions of Prime Minister
John Gorton in preventing the possible takeover of one of the larger in-
surers, the MLC Ltd., by the British firm Sun/Alliance. He signaled to
the market that foreign investment was welcome up to a point.^ ^
Australian life insurers reacted to increased competition from over-
seas providers by diversifying their operations. Diversification occurred
initially in response to the entrance of general insurers into the life-
insurance market. Within five years of the registration of the Legal and
General as a life insurer, all major life insurers had established general
insurance subsidiaries. This shift into the general insurance market was
a stepping-stone for life insurers who then used the same model to shift
53 Like many British companies, the Legal and General first entered the Australian market
in 1948 selling general insurance before moving across into the life-insurance market. One
motivation for this shift was the growth in pensions insurance after World War II. The Legal
and General was a leader in the provision of this type of insurance in the United Kingdom
and was so successful that it moved from the tenth to the second largest insurer between the
1930s and 1950. Leslie Hannah, Inventing Retirement: The Development of Occupational
Pensions in Britain (Cambridge, UK, 1986), 37-38.
^ Life Insurance Commission, Annual Report (Canberra, 1962).
55 Gray, Life Insurance, 257.
5'Swiss Re, Australian Reinsurance Company, General Manager's Report 1967, Ms
10.169577.05, Swiss Re Archives, Zurich.
5'Swiss Re, Australian Reinsurance Company, General Manager's Report 1968, Ms
10.169577.06, Swiss Re Archives, Zurich.
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into other financial markets. Before long, the main life-insurance com-
panies had subsidiary finance companies, money market corporations,
superannuation funds, and building societies.^^ Notably, however, the
focus was on building domestic rather than international markets. The
main center of overseas attention continued to be the New Zealand
market, where Australian life insurers accounted for the majority of
policies sold.59
Phase Three: The Internationalization of Australian Life Insur-
ers. The impetus to increasing outward FDI that marked the third
phase of the internationahzation process arose as a consequence of the
deregulation of financial markets. The dismantling of the regulatory
controls that had influenced market activity for the previous three de-
cades marked the decade of the 1980s. The focus of regulatory control
after 1945 had been on the banking sector that had been heavily re-
stricted in the types of activities it could undertake. Deregulation had
wide-ranging implications for Australian financial markets. The lifting
of controls reduced barriers to entry and market segmentation, creating
opportunities for the development of new institutions that no longer fo-
cused on the provision of one type of product. The emergence of finan-
cial conglomerates providing a wdde range of financial services was an
outcome of this process.^"
The restructuring of the financial sector had major implications for
insurance markets and insurance providers. Within the life-insurance
market, the reduction in barriers to entry allowed institutions such as
banks to compete directly with established firms.^^ In 1985 the first of the
big four Australian banks entered the life-insurance market. Within four
years all major banks had acquired registration to sell life-insurance
products. These banks were able to make use of existing branch net-
works to sell insurance products. This allowed them to acquire market
share rapidly. Five years after entering the market, the largest three
Australian banks were ranked within the top ten life insurers wdth re-
spect to new business.
Concurrent wdth an increase in competition, the demand for tradi-
tional life-insurance products was also in decline, placing pressure on
the margins of the long established insurers. The value of ordinary life-
insurance business fell from A$i,090 million in 1989 to A$i72 million
in 1995.^ ^ The trend away from the conventional life insurance began in
5^  Keneley, "Adaptation and Change," 99-100.
5' The Review, 24 Sept. 1954,925.
'"Kevin Davis, "Financial Restructuring in Australia," Economic Papers 16 (1997): 12.
*' Previously, bank-owned subsidiaries had operated in insurance markets, but they were
restricted from fully utilizing banking networks.
* ^ P , Principal Board Minutes, Appendix E, 26 June 1996, AMP Archives, Sydney.
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the 1970s when inflation began to erode policy values. It gained mo-
mentum as new products such as investment-linked policies became
more popular in the 1980s. It accelerated further with the introduction
of compulsory superannuation in the 199OS.^ ^ The rapid fall in demand
was attributed to the public's loss of confidence in the product and the
increasing attractiveness of new alternatives such as unit trusts. The
magnitude of the change placed additional pressures on life insurers to
seek alternative strategies to maintain their competitive position.
The increasing influence of large competitors (such as banks) in the
life-insurance market was a major catalyst in the decision by estab-
lished life insurers to look for opportunities offshore. In the view of one
major insurer, prospects for expansion in local markets (Australia and
New Zealand) were limited.^ '* In this context, the decision to expand
into international markets was driven by local considerations in a bid to
retain their relative market position.
From the mid-1980s the major Australian life insurers began to in-
vestigate the potential for development of overseas operations.^^ The
wave of expansion gained momentum during the 1990s with each of the
major players adopting a different method of expansion. The AMP,
which traditionally had only a very limited exposure overseas (London
and New Zealand), took the decision to focus on expansion, primarily
in the United Kingdom, where it acquired two British life insurers in
the late 1980s. The rationale behind this decision was that it was a fa-
miliar market v^ dth fewer cultural and language difterences.^^ It was as-
sumed that these factors would lead to market synergies, which would
allow for a more rapid expansion of market share. The principal method
used to establish in this market was acquisition. The focus was on tar-
geting similar businesses that were undervalued. The first business ac-
quired in this manner was the British life insurer, the Pearl. London
Life was the second acquisition. A limitation of the acquisition path to
expansion was that the acquirer had to have the strategic competencies
required; firstly, to identify viable targets and secondly, to manage ac-
quired firms effectively. In the case of the AMP's acquisitions at this
'3 Compulsory superannuation, where all employers were required to deposit a propor-
tion (a minimum of 9 percent) of salaries into their employees' pension fund, was introduced
in 1992. Most superannuation policies had a life-insurance component, reducing the need to
take out separate life insurance.
'••AMP, Memorandum for Principal Board, 19 Feb. 1987, AMP Archives, Sydney.
*5The major life insurers in this context are defined as those whose core business is de-
rived from the sale of life-insurance products and are listed in the top twenty life insurers in
terms of assets in 1990. The firms identified were the three mutuals, AMP, National Mutual
Life, and Colonial Mutual. The remainder of the top twenty consisted of nine overseas, four
general insurers, three bank-owned, and one other (ovraed by a property management
company).
^ ' P , Principal Board Minutes, Appendix, 1 Mar. 1989, AMP Archives, Sydney.
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time, neither the Pearl nor London Life lived up to expectations. Lon-
don Life, which was acquired in 1989, was closed to new business in
1995 as a result of poor performance. Pearl also performed poorly and
went through several reviews before a full-scale reconstruction of the
United Kingdom portfolio led to its integration with other British inter-
ests into a newly formed division: UK Financial Services. '^' Similar ex-
periences with other British acquisitions, including the National Provi-
dent Institution and Hendersons Global Investments, meant that the
overseas acquisition strategy of the AMP at this time was far from suc-
cessful. In 2003, for example, the performance of British interests of
the AMP were responsible for an A$5.8 billion loss, the worst loss in
Australian corporate history.^^
Attempts to expand into other markets were also not successful.
The AMP attempted to establish a presence in Hong Kong and Indone-
sia in the mid-1990s. However, it did not retain a presence in these
countries for long. The Hong Kong market proved too competitive, and
the AMP was not able to establish the market share it expected. The In-
donesian experience, on the other hand, highlighted the pitfalls of ven-
turing into a market the company did not fully understand. The busi-
ness in Indonesia was conducted through a joint venture agreement
with a local bank. The breakdown in the relationship between the two
partners, exacerbated by cultural difterences, was a key factor in the de-
cision to leave that country.^^ By 1996 the AMP had divested its inter-
ests in both these countries as part of a restructuring of its international
strategy.
Both the National Mutual and the Colonial Mutual had a broader
approach to FDI. The primary method of expansion used by the Na-
tional Mutual was to establish new enterprises in selected countries. A
secondary strategy was to develop joint ventures with indigenous sup-
pliers. This was the case in Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea.
In 1990 the National Mutual had interests in New Zealand, Hong Kong,
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the United States. In 1993 it imple-
mented an Asia/Pacific-based strategy and sold interests in the UK, Ire-
land, and the US to support this strategy. From that date the company
progressively increased its presence in the Asian region, listing firstly
on the Hong Kong stock exchange (National Mutual Asia Ltd). Within
three years it had interests in nine Asia/Pacific countries. A limitation
^''AM?, Annual Reports (Sydney, 1998-2000).
^^ The Australian, 21 Aug. and 15 Oct. 2003. Progressive losses due to falling demand for
AMP products in the UK and management problems led the AMP to divest itself of much of
its UK business when it demerged from its British funds management arm Henderson Global
Investors.
' 'AMP, Memorandum, 24 Oct. 1997, AMP Archives, Sydney.
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of the approach adopted by the National Mutual, however, was the cre-
ation of brand loyalty in these new markets. The National Mutual over-
came this problem to a certain extent when it took over the running of
Asian business of the firm AXA. While this strategy solved one problem,
it created other pressures for the National Mutual. The French-based
company AXA bought into the National Mutual in 1996 as a means of
extending its Asian business.'^" Its majority shareholder subsumed the
National Mutual identity and rebadged it as AXA Asia/Pacific in 2000.
The National Mutual lost much of its corporate identity when this
occurred.
The Colonial Mutual had operations in the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, Southern Aftica, and Fiji. In 1990 it commenced its first foray
into Asian markets by establishing a presence in Hong Kong through a
joint-venture arrangement. The company used this approach to develop
markets in Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines ftom 1993. By
1997 it had a presence in six Asia/Pacific markets. Direct ownership in-
creased as the company began to buy out its joint venture partner pro-
gressively, beginning with the Hong Kong arrangement in 1997. The
overall strategy adopted by the Colonial Mutual was different ftom that
of the other major life insurers. In 1994 it acquired Australia's fifth larg-
est bank, the State Bank of New South Wales, creating a conglomerate
structure that it later built on to diversify into other financial markets.
A result of the merger process was the demutualization of the insurer,
which listed as a public company in 1997. The banking arm of the orga-
nization represented a significant component of company assets. At the
time of the merger with the State Bank of NSW, banking assets repre-
sented A$i9 billion while insurance assets were A$i3.9 billion.^ ^ It is
not surprising in the aftermath of the acquisition that there was a refo-
cusing of corporate strategy to take advantage of these assets. The Colo-
nial was the first of Australia's large financial institutions to adopt the
New Zealand firm Allfinanz's strategy, integrating the production and
distribution of financial services through its banking networks. It also
applied this strategy to its international interests, allowing a broader
marketing base with which to operate in overseas markets. The re-
orientation of focus towards the utilization of banking assets and the
development of an Allfinanz approach made the organization suscepti-
ble in the domestic market. The pressure within the financial sector to
build a diversified portfolio of business interests resulted in the emer-
gence of large financial conglomerates, a trend growing in momentum
^° The Age, 14 Nov. 2009.
" Elisa Bain and Ian Harper, "Integration of Financial Services: Evidence from Australia,"
North American Actuarial Journal ¿i, no. 3 (2000): 1-19.
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throughout the 1990s. The impetus to build size and scope through
merger and acquisition continued throughout the 1990s. The Colonial
itself became the target of such a strategy when the Commonwealth
Bank acquired it in 2000.
The Impact of Past Heritage
Three factors have been influential in the historical development of
the Australian life insurers and their ability to develop the knowledge
base needed for successful overseas expansion. These are the structure
of the domestic market, the predominance of mutual associations over
a considerable period of time, and the capabilities of these firms that
would allow them to manage oftshore interests eftectively.
The early success of mutual life-insurance societies from the 1860s
to the turn of the century ensured their place as market leaders for
many years to come. Within the small domestic market they were the
giants of the industry, making it difficult for new entrants to capture
any sizeable share of the market. The major mutuals accounted for in
excess of four-fifths of industry assets, leaving the remaining one-fifth
to be shared among several small private insurers, one government in-
surer, and three overseas insurers. The loyalty of consumers to indige-
nous insurers, particularly the mutuals, created a barrier that was diffi-
cult to overcome. Geoffrey Blainey remarks that nationalism was
stronger in business than the arts and that, by the end of the nineteenth
century, Australians had developed a preference for doing business
with their own financial institutions.^^ The status quo remained unchal-
lenged until the late 1950s, when the Legal and General applied for reg-
istration to sell life insurance. During this time, domestic market condi-
tions and the inherent conservatism of mutual insurers combined to
restrict the development of international links. In the postwar period
Australia experienced what has been termed "the long boom." The av-
erage rate of growth in GNP was 3.9 percent between 1940 and 1970,
the population nearly doubled from just under 7 million to 12.4 million,
and real income per capita increased, more than doubling in that time.^ ^
The growth of the economy provided the scope for expansion in domes-
tic life-insurance demand that was sufficient to support supply without
creating undue competitive pressures.
Although the entrance of foreign insurers and general insurers
opened the life-insurance market up in the 1950s, it did not challenge
^^  Blainey, A History of the AMP, 71.
'3 Rodney Maddock and Ian McLean, eds.. The Australian Economy in the Long Run
(Cambridge, UK, 1987).
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the large mutuals, which were recognized as market leaders.^ '* The
numbers of registered life insurers increased in absolute terms but the
relative size of new competitors did not. In i960 the five mutual offices
accounted for 80 percent of industry assets and the remaining fourteen
registered insurers, 20 percent. By 1980, four mutual offices accounted
for 69 percent and forty-three non-mutuals 31 percent.''^ The majorify
of non-mutuals were either foreign-owned subsidiaries or companies
acquired by overseas firms. This was a trend that persisted over the next
decade.
In 1990 there were fifty-six registered life-insurance providers in
Australia.^^ Thirty-one of those registered were subsidiaries of overseas
firms. Of the twenty-five remaining, only seven counted their core busi-
ness as the provision of life insurance.^^ Among the largest insurers in
this group were the three mutual insurers, who accounted for 72 per-
cent of industry assets.^^ The Australian life-insurance market was rela-
tively small, and the majority of local firms operating in the market
were small as well. The capabilify of these firms to expand beyond do-
mestic boundaries was limited.
Of the Australian life insurers, the three major mutuals were the
best placed to develop overseas interests. They were well established
and large enough to sustain this type of expansion. However, they ap-
peared to have little interest in doing so until domestic competitive
pressures mounted in the 1980s as banks made greater inroads into
their traditional markets. The experience of poHcyholder opposition to
the AMP efforts in attempting to establish its London office serves to
highlight the quandary faced by these organizations. As custodians of
the mutual assets of their members, they were required to ensure their
actions did not put these assets at risk. This explains in part, why these
organizations limited the geographic spread of outward FDI.
A third factor impacting on the ability of life insurers to expand
internationally was their organizational history and development. The
major life insurers modeled their organizational structures on what they
observed of the banking sector. The branch system of administration
'''' Unlike the British market and the Australian general insurance market, there was no
tariff system in place governing market conduct. There is also no evidence to suggest that
other price-fixing arrangements were in place.
''^Australasian Insurance and Banking Record (i960); Life Insurance Commission, An-
nual Report (Canberra, 1980).
^'insurance and Superannuation Commission, Half-Yearly Financial Bulletin on Life
Insurance (Canberra, 1990).
^A further six were subsidiaries of general insurers, and an additional six were bank
owned. The remaining six were either subsidiaries of other life insurers or other financial ser-
vice providers. Of the seven life insurers listed in 1990, four were mutuals and three, small
providers.
*^ Insurance and Superannuation Commission (Canberra, 1990).
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was a logical outcome of the early expansion path of these firms. As the
life-insurance institution grew, it opened branches in the main popula-
tion centers of neighboring colonies. Each branch eventually had a num-
ber of offices attached to it as further growth took place. The approach
taken to the administration of this system was generally highly central-
ized. Branches, both local and overseas, had a small degree of autonomy
but were essentially directed by the head office. The role of the branches
was to expand scale and implement the plans determined by central-
ized decision-making processes. There was generally tight operational
control of resources and information leading to the development of bu-
reaucratic processes formalizing the flow of information down the line.
The use of internal labor markets to assist in the management and pro-
tect the integrity of large volumes of data led to the creation of office
systems that further reinforced the centralized control system.
Reforms to organizational structures occurred in response to
changing competitive pressures. In the 1950s life insurers moved from
a branch-based to a divisional-based structure in an eftort to cut costs
and retain their market advantage in the face of increased competition
from new entrants. A divisional structure v^th its greater emphasis on
specialization allowed the development of new routines that encour-
aged more sophisticated strategic planning processes. From this, the
subsidiary structure emerged, which allowed life insurers to diversify
into difterent markets. A weakness of this approach, however, was that
it did not give the organization and its managers direct experience in
the management of business within these markets. Instead they re-
mained as interested onlookers.
The divisional structure based along functional lines served these
organizations well in the 1960s and early 1970s, allowing them to intro-
duce new technologies and processes in the back office and market new
financial products to suit changing consumer demand. By the 1980s,
however, the major mutuals were finding themselves increasingly ham-
strung by their organizational bureaucracies. A key problem was that
previous organizational structures had been superimposed on one an-
other so that by the 1980s a complex array of structural forms coexisted
side by side. For example, although the divisional structure had re-
placed the branch structure, geographic divisions (branches) still ex-
isted alongside product divisions. Functional groupings added another
layer to the structure. A report to the AMP in 1987 found that much of
the structure and practices of this organization had outlived their value
and original purpose but had remained in place.^ ^ The result had led to
conflicting lines of authority and costly management systems.
' 'Centre of Organization Research Design and Strategy (CORDS), Report to the AMP,
Aug. 1987, AMP Archives, Sydney.
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Another round of organizational restructures occurred in response
to increasing market competition. Firms such as the AMP and National
Mutual called in outside consultants to conduct a number of organiza-
tional reviews. In the case of the National Mutual this resulted in the re-
organization of its internal structure into three separate divisions that
distinguished between its insurance operations, its investment opera-
tions, and its overseas operations.^" The AMP undertook a similar pro-
cess of modernization with the dismantling of its remaining branch struc-
ture and a greater centralization of decision-making processes. The
changes to the organizational structure of the AMP were associated with
a change in culture as it sought to modernize its Board of Directors and
executive. The number of directors was cut from seventeen to twelve and
a much greater emphasis placed on appointment with diversified inter-
national experience.^ ^ These reforms provided the platform on which life
insurers could launch their international campaigns, but they remained
constrained by their mutual structures and their inward looking heritage.
Although promotion and recruitment procedures had been loosened up,
it remained difficult to appoint senior executives with appropriate ex-
perience of international markets. Managers, many of whom had attained
their position through the promotion processes of the internal labor mar-
ket, often lacked an in-depth experience of international operations.
Mutual structures were a further constraint in prescribing the types
of activities a life insurer could pursue. They placed limitations on the
ability of some firms to expand overseas. They also placed limitations
on the ability to develop as financial conglomerates. The final stage in
the development of organizational structures occurred with the demu-
tualization of these institutions. The Colonial and National Mutual de-
mutualized in 1996 and the AMP in 1998. While the reasons for taking
the decision varied, the pace of outwards FDI increased markedly after
this time.
The preceding discussion indicates that internationalization strate-
gies were evolving as Australian insurers ventured further into global
markets. Prior to the 1980s management viewed its overseas operations
as adjuncts to the domestic business. The emphasis was on centralized
decision-making processes where overseas interests, as with local
branches, existed to assist in the delivery of products. Overseas opera-
tions were branches of the domestic concern and as such were subject
to the same management practice as local branches. This type of strat-
egy proved successful in the small and relatively undeveloped market of
New Zealand that had a similar heritage and population profile. It was
*° Roy Kriegler, Peter Dawkins, Jane Ryan, and Mark Wooden, Achieving Organizational
Effectiveness: Case Studies in the Australian Service Sector (Melbourne, 1988).
^'AMP, Annual Report (Sydney, 1995).
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less successful in the more diverse markets such as that in the United
Kingdom, where greater levels of competition made it difficult to estab-
lish a significant market presence. The approach adopted by Australian
insurers in this period did not facilitate the expansion of a global net-
work and overseas interests remained small until new strategies were
adopted. The third phase of internationalization, beginning in the mid-
1980s, witnessed various attempts at developing more sustainable ap-
proaches to overseas expansion. The difterent strategies applied repre-
sented a learning curve as the large life insurers sought to break away
from the constraints imposed by their past heritage with varying de-
grees of success. The acquisition model of expansion, for example, did
not prove very successful for the AMP, which later had to divest or re-
structure its overseas assets. Lack of experience in these markets was a
contributing factor to the problems experienced and was a legacy of the
internal culture of the firm. The joint-venture formula adopted by the
Colonial was more fruitful. This strategy combined with the Allfinanz
approach and its associated diversification into other markets allowed
the organization to öfter a more extensive range of products overseas
and tailor them to specific markets more readily. Such a model allowed
the company to rapidly build a presence in the comparatively new mar-
kets of the Asia/Pacific. The National Mutual approach of using both
subsidiaries and branches to develop its overseas interests met with
moderate success. A key problem was the establishment of a local iden-
tity and customer base. Recent moves by the parent company AXA to
divest itself of its Australian business indicate that the outcomes were
not as successful as expected.
Conclusion
In exploring the path of internationalization followed by Australian
life insurers, it is evident that local conditions and past heritage had a
significant bearing on the ability of these firms to pursue global strate-
gies. The structure of the domestic market dominated by a small num-
ber of large mutual providers meant that a limited number of firms had
the capacity to go oftshore. Those that did were constrained not only by
their governance systems but also by their strategic capabilities, a func-
tion of their organizational structure. The branch system of administra-
tion that the major insurers adopted was not particularly suited to
large-scale overseas expansion. The centralization of major decision-
making processes and associated management procedures fostered an
inward-looking approach. Overseas operations were largely seen as ap-
pendages to the domestic operation. As such, there was little scope to
develop specific strategies suited to the particular characteristics of the
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overseas center. This heritage did not equip life insurers well for global
expansion. To expand beyond their limited international exposure,
these firms needed to restructure and develop new capabilities. This
was a process they had little interest in until domestic competition
began to challenge their market share in the 1980s. Belatedly realizing
that the home market was not large enough to support all contenders,
they turned their attention to the international arena. In this respect,
the movement offshore was driven primarily by domestic consider-
ations. The restructuring of operational capabilities that occurred as life
insurers began to transform themselves into financial-service providers
enabled the development of new approaches to international markets.
The differing strategies adopted met wdth a varying degree of success in
the 1990s as the search continued for the right international model.
The heritage of the firm and the market in which it operates offer a
deeper understanding of the forces encouraging and discouraging the
development of cross-border trade. In the Australian case there was no
real incentive for offshore expansion while local markets offered suffi-
cient scope for growth and development. It wasn't until demand and
supply conditions changed in the 1980s and competition from other fi-
nancial service providers began to impact on market share that firms
began to take a more global outlook. The structure of the domestic mar-
ket, the firm's place wdthin this structure, and the evolution of its inter-
nal organizational processes all influenced the abilify to undertake
overseas expansion. Their organizational history often impeded those
firms wdth the size and resources capable of venturing offshore. The in-
herent conservatism of mutual structures together wdth their multilay-
ered organizational bureaucracies fostered a culture that was slow to
change. It was not until these structures were reformed that managerial
capabilities began to expand and take an international focus. This arti-
cle posed the question. Does organizational heritage matter in company
internationalization? The story of Australian life insurers shows not to
discount this factor.
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